https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai Latest research papers, blog posts, and grey literature — curated and classified by AI en Wed, 16 Sep 2026 22:27:45 GMT https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/icon.png https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers INTRODUCTIONWashington State, along with the rest of the world, is facing and will continue to face significant environmental challenges. Air pollution, soil pollution, and climate change all pose serious threats to the state's natural environment, economy, and citizens' health. To tackle these threats, this Comment argues for an amendment to the Washington State Constitution that enshrines a broad public trust duty and provides a positive right1 to a healthy environment. To protect Washingtonians' health and welfare, and to ensure a healthy environment for generations to come, the Washington State Constitution should be amended to include the following provision:(a) The state of Washington is the trustee of Washington's natural environment, including the air, water, soil, and ocean shores. It is one of the principal duties of the state to protect, preserve, and restore the state's natural environment for the current generation and for generations to come. Those residing within Washington's borders, now and in the future, have a positive right to live in and enjoy a healthy environment.(b) This amendment shall take full effect immediately upon the approval and ratification by the qualified voters. The legislature may take action to carry out the purposes of this section, but no such action shall be required for this section to become effective.2This language provides a positive right to a healthy environment. Like the right to education,3 this proposed language would allow citizens to sue the government4 to declare and enforce their rights,5 and would encourage both the legislature and the courts to prioritize environmental protection.6 The provision is meant to encompass all aspects of the natural environment-including those, like air and water, that are affected by climate change-and enshrine a broad public trust duty in the State Constitution.7 Although adding such an amendment may seem radical at first glance, this Comment will demonstrate that it is not radical8 and that it is necessary.9This Comment proceeds in two parts. Part I shows that adding this amendment to the Washington State Constitution would not be a radical departure from Washington's history, current policy, existing constitutional structure, and national and international trends. First, this Part provides an overview of the public trust doctrine-both generally10 and in Washington specifically.11 As this Comment illustrates, Washington's public trust doctrine is well established, in line with the doctrine's ancient origins and its modern interpretation in other states,12 and that the traditional, narrow public trust doctrine is already enshrined in article XVII, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution.13 This Comment then explains how there is room for expansion of Washington's common law public trust doctrine.14 As Part I demonstrates, codifying a broad public trust duty in a constitutional amendment would not be a radical leap from existing Washington common law.Part I continues with a discussion of current Washington laws that exemplify an existing commitment to the environment. 15 It then discusses other constitutionally protected positive rights, demonstrating that including one for the environment would not be unprecedented, and would allow the State Constitution to reflect Washingtonians' values.16 This Part concludes with an overview of the national and international scene.17 In addition to providing a broad overview of the frequency of constitutional environmental protection provisions, this Part provides six concrete examples-three national 18 and three international19-of how this right has been utilized elsewhere to protect the environment and tackle major environmental challenges.While Part I lays the groundwork for why the proposed amendment would not be a radical step, Part II explains why such an amendment is necessary to protect the health and welfare of Washingtonians. This Part first explores some of Washington's existing environmental problems, including air, water, and land/soil pollution. … Sun, 01 Mar 2015 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W1142169840 Washington law review climate_policy_general referendum journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Missouri receives more than 80% of its electricity from coal – more than two times the national average. Nearly all coal burned in Missouri power plants is imported from states such as Wyoming causing a $1.1 billion drain on Missouri’s economy. Historically, Missouri has been slow to expand the use of renewable energy. In 2005, Missouri received less than .01% of its electricity from renewables and ranked 49th in the country on renewable energy usage.nIn an attempt to increase the in-state development of renewable energy, Missouri advocates worked to pass a renewable electricity standard and solar rebate through a voter enacted initiative in 2008. In its first two years, the Missouri solar rebate created a 3400% increase in the amount of solar photovoltaic (PV) installed in Ameren and Kansas City Power and Light’s service territory. In those utility territories, PV capacity grew from 38 installations totaling 100 kilowatts in 2009 to 474 installs totaling 3500 kilowatts (3.5 megawatts) in 2011.nThe purpose of this report is to analyze the impact and cost-effectiveness of the Missouri solar rebate. The report also quantifies the clean air and economic benefits of the Missouri solar rebate with the goal of helping citizens and policymakers make informed decisions about the future of solar energy in Missouri. Thu, 26 Apr 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W140977030 DukeSpace (Duke University) solar_energy referendum journal_article https://doi.org/10.1068/c1122 Limited quantitative research has been devoted to voluntary climate actions at the local level. It is unclear why some cities act as leaders in the fight against climate change, some act as followers, while others remain laggards. This study tests hypotheses about local climate proactiveness to mitigate climate change. Applying a survival analysis to California cities' adoption of the US Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, I examine the association between cities' adoption of the agreement, a range of cities' characteristics, and the behavior of neighboring jurisdictions. The results suggest important roles of the overall capacity of a local jurisdiction, its staff capacity with relevant expertise, average household income level, and voter preferences. Study results also suggest the importance of local traffic conditions and the positive peer effect. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W1540921642 Environment and Planning C Government and Policy climate_policy_general local_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers The article examines from a European Union (EU) perspective whether the instructional structure of modernity that is part of the climate change problem also be part of the solution. It deals with three different solution strategies such as ecological modernization, green governmentality and civic environmentalism. Compared to many countries, the level of problem awareness in the EU is rather high although public opinion polls reveal significant differences among individual member states. Green parties and environmental movements have contributed to the current prominence of environmental politics in the EU. Sun, 22 Jun 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W1579601217 Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) climate_policy_general european_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-31551 This paper analyzes the effect of the 2002 German federal elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag) on the financial performance of German energy corporations.We consider the last minute victory of the government coalition consisting of Social Democrats and the Green party which was generally associated with a major shift in energy policy towards the promotion of renewable energies and a phasing out of nuclear energy. Our event study approach is based on the application of the Fama-French three-factor model to estimate abnormal stock returns. The results of the empirical analysis imply neither for traditional utilities nor for renewable energy corporations any robust positive or negative impact of the elections and therefore of the general energy policy direction of the government in the next legislative period. Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W1588016322 Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) green_subsidy national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2014.3.1.4295 Solving collective action problems, such as poverty reduction or climate change, depends on interactions between governments' and voters' preferences regarding pro-social actions. This paper examines whether the overall direction of change in pro-social public policy precedes public value-change, rather than the other way around. We examine change in the public’s pro-social values in six European countries, as measured by the European Social Survey (ESS) during 2002-2012. In these countries, we conducted an expert survey to rate governmental policy that expresses these values over the same period, thereby examining value-change in governmental policy. The chronological comparison of value-change of the public with that of respective governments suggests that changes in pro-social government policies may drive public value-change rather than vice versa. This complements previous studies focused on the opinion-policy connection. Possible political implications are discussed. The promising findings of this initial study point to the importance of conducting larger-scale future studies. Fri, 27 Jun 2014 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W1593078096 European Journal of Government and Economics climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, the German government amended the nuclear law to shut down all nuclear power plants by 2022 and has implemented policies for the energy transition. The German’s way for nuclear exit could be paved through the 40 years sustained anti-nuclear movements, the by the movements shaped ‘Atomausstieg’ policy, and the development of renewable energy. The history of german anti-nuclear movements started with the anti-movements against nuclear power plants building by the residents who lived in the selected sites of plants. Since the middle 1970s the anti-nuclear movements had evolved into a national movement, which led to the regression of nuclear energy policy. The issues of the movements covered not only the nuclear power plant, but also the spent fuel reprocessing and the nuclear waste storage. As the result of movements, the green party could be founded and the issue “Atomausstieg” was made to the top of the political agenda. In 2000 the red green coalition reached an agreement with the energy companies to phase out nuclear energy, while they followed policy for promoting renewable energy. The german experiences have implications for our discussion about the korean way to nuclear exit. Wed, 01 Feb 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W1954585238 역사비평 climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.5642/urceu.20132013.10 The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) stands as a model for managing a changing climate in a complicated international environment. As it enters its Phase III period of auctioning emissions permits, an understanding of players and their performance is essential to evaluating the success of the emissions market. Concerns that wealthy countries will purchase permits, rather than reduce their real emissions, have led to skepticism about the system’s potential for success. In this study, I examine ambition exhibited by countries in using less than maximum allowable levels of offsets to achieve Phase II reduction requirements. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, I explore a number of variables including economic growth, Green Party representation, public opinion, and renewable energy investment to construct a model explaining variety in exhibited ambition among ETS countries. Results show that renewable energy and public opinion play the most significant role in explaining a country’s use of offsets. Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W1979254189 Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union emissions_trading national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers For the first time in living memory, the environment is receiving significant attention in a presidential election. Both Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) have given speeches and run television advertisements on the issue and (after a slow start) are being asked questions by the national press about where they stand on climate change and energy.nThis article compares the actions and positions of the two candidates on environmental, energy, and resources issues. It begins by looking at their voting records, presents their endorsements and campaign contributions, and then discusses their positions as shown in their campaign position papers, speeches, responses to voter questionnaires, and similar sources. The intent here is to provide an objective comparison without evaluating the merits of the stances taken. Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W198570616 eYLS (Yale Law School) climate_policy_general presidential_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1890/1540-9295(2008)6[394:smate]2.0.co;2 Now that Americans have endured the political squabbles of a primary season almost devoid of environmental debate, it is time to start digging into the environmental credentials of the presidential hopefuls of the two dominant parties. Let's begin with the presumptive Republican nominee, Senator John McCain. His Democratic counterpart, Senator Barack Obama, will be the subject of next month's column. It is remarkable how political candidates change course and home in on “hot topics”. The economy and increases in the price of gas, food, and practically every other consumer item have suddenly made the environment (especially fossil-fuel exploration and use) a top election issue. So, where does this presidential aspirant stand on the environment? The answer seems to be “all over the place”. Senator McCain's political philosophy is hard to categorize; he is neither a solid conservative nor the maverick he tries to project. In May, his campaign reported the following statement: “Distancing himself from President Bush, John McCain pledged a new era of environmental stewardship…as he outlined his plan to address global warming, a cause he has embraced since activists hounded him during his 2000 run for president”. The McCain camp would have us believe that, “There is a long-standing, significant, deep, strong difference on [the environment]” between the Senator and the Bush Administration. The Center for American Progress disagrees, however, and has a scathing view of the McCain environmental platform. On the 2007 League of Conservation Voters' scale of 0–100, he scored zero – right down there with the Bush Administration. In fairness, however, Senator McCain has called for limits on greenhouse-gas emissions, unlike President Bush, who opposes such limits as being bad for the economy. McCain has long supported a “cap and trade” system, in which power plants and other industries could meet limits on emissions, such as those of CO2, by either reducing emissions on their own or by purchasing credits from more efficient producers. However, he retreated somewhat from his original plan (developed with Senator Joe Lieberman) and his own campaign's statements, when he recently refused to endorse a mandatory cap and trade system. So, is the Senator a maverick, or is he simply marching to the tune the Bush Administration has been playing? In June, a San Francisco Chronicle columnist observed approvingly that, “For too long, Mr McCain talked like a Democrat…he was in favor of greater energy independence, of reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions, and of no new drilling off the coasts or plan to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil – and cheap gasoline. To believe all that is possible in this global market, you essentially have to believe in a ‘good energy fairy’. When gas prices exceeded 4 per gallon, Mr McCain, like many taxpayers, hit the tipping point, where he could no longer afford the romanticized view that oil should only be pumped from yucky places.” Senator McCain has previously opposed the President's plan to open ANWR to oil drilling. However, in mid-June, he seemingly altered his view on ANWR, when he stated that, although he opposed ANWR drilling, he endorsed receiving “new information about ANWR, [and] how environmentally we can make it safe”. The cry of protest from environmental groups still resonates. McCain critics are quick to point out that he reportedly missed all crucial environmental votes in the Senate, opposed tax breaks for alternative energy, and favored the so-called “gas-tax holiday”. Despite his new-found support for automobile battery innovation incentives (labeled even by some conservative commentators as a “desperation gimmick”), he has been opposed to extending renewable energy tax credits to support clean energy development, while endorsing the construction of 100 new nuclear power facilities. So, there are some contradictions in the Senator's environmental platform. Now that he has decided that his administration would give a 300 million prize to the inventor of an efficient and economical car battery, I am headed to the hardware store for a big spool of copper wire, and then reading up on the Tesla and the Volt. See you in November, Senator McCain! Fri, 29 Aug 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2000207922 Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment climate_policy_general presidential_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530802207427 The Australian federal election of 24 November 2007 saw the defeat of the Howard Liberal-National Party coalition government after almost 12 years in office and brought to power a Labor government, the first since 1996, under the leadership of Kevin Rudd. John Howard, Australia's second longest-serving prime minister, became only the second prime minister to lose his own seat at an election. This article summarizes the election result and places it in the context of post-Second World War Australian political and electoral history. The highly unusual character of the large swing to the Labor Party is underlined, as is the rarity of a change of government in Australia since the Second World War. The article also examines the influence of the political leadership of the two major parties in contributing to the changing climate of opinion during 2007 and surveys the campaign itself, underlining the many problems experienced by the Howard government in the final weeks of its life. Finally, the article emphasizes the critical roles that interest rates, climate change and industrial relations all played in fatally undermining the Howard ascendancy. The government, faced with a politically credible and electorally attractive opponent, emerging economic difficulties and a shifting policy agenda, was unable to present itself as equipped to deal with new local and global challenges after a long period in power. Tue, 29 Jul 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2022796356 The Round Table climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1890/1540-9295(2008)6[450:soate]2.0.co;2 With political reporting being what it is, one fears that Americans know more about Senator Barack Obama's three-point shooting ability than his stance on the environment. However, it may be that former Vice President Al Gore's summer challenge – on behalf of renewable energy – struck a chord with the American people, and that this message has stuck with Obama, who has said that he would support investing $150 billion over 10 years in alternative energy research. He believes that “we cannot drill our way to energy independence, but must fast-track investments in renewable sources of energy like solar power, wind power, and advanced biofuels”. Unlike his Republican counterpart, Senator John McCain, and his running mate, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, a conservative on environmental issues, Senator Obama has condemned calls for drilling offshore and in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, although he conceded that some offshore drilling might be acceptable. He has boldly called for energy efficiency to be doubled within 18 years. The League of Conservation Voters' “0%” rating for McCain (although his lifetime record stands at “26%”) is in sharp contrast to their “86%” rating (down from “96%” only because of missed votes) for Obama over his 3 years in the US Senate, a rating that is largely based on Obama's introduction or co-sponsoring of nearly 100 environmentally friendly bills, including proposed legislation on reducing mercury emissions, raising fuel-economy standards for automobiles, and promoting biofuels production. (If a “below zero” rating were recognized, Palin would qualify. The day she stated that “the jury was out” regarding global warming, the Markham Ice Shelf separated from Canada's Ellesmere Island. Why would the governor of the state closest to the North Pole not be concerned about predictions that the Pole will be ice-free in a few years?) On the other hand, some environmental groups are skeptical of Obama's support for coal-to-liquids technology, and his apparent enthusiasm for ethanol-based fuels. Both candidates understand the need to cut carbon emissions, but disagree on how to accomplish this. Both support measures to maintain/enhance US energy security, but in somewhat different ways; Obama has supported corn-based ethanol and cellulosic-based fuels as fuel additives, whereas McCain has objected to ethanol and ethanol subsidies. Obama has strongly advocated new regulation of animal feeding operations for pollution mitigation. McCain has been mostly silent on this issue. The candidates differ on the nuclear power option. Obama is cautious about nuclear power, would end the development of the Yucca Mountain nuclear storage facility, and promotes the need for stronger scientific analyses. McCain is a dedicated supporter of nuclear power and the Yucca Mountain facility. Obama has fairly consistently supported development of green technologies, reductions in fossil-fuel consumption, and increases in fuel-efficiency standards. McCain has spoken out in favor of tougher emissions standards, the creation of nuclear and “clean coal” power plants, the use of alternative energy sources, and electric cars. Obama has promoted inner-city recycling programs, advanced environmental justice, and has fought environmental racism, a subject that McCain has largely avoided. Obama has called for reductions in both mercury and lead emissions to protect community health, a position with which McCain has basically agreed. Obama emphasizes the protection of the Great Lakes and our National Parks and Forests, while NRA member Palin supports aerial wolf hunting and has refused to take action to protect polar bears in Alaska. Neither candidate is entirely clear on how these critical issues would be funded. Obama would probably push for tax incentives and a tax on carbon emissions. McCain's position is not very different. So, will McCain's maverick image and his public divorce (or perhaps it's a trial separation) from the Bush Administration's environmental policies bode well for the environment, or will Obama's activist image portend better solutions to pressing problems? Most pundits believe that a McCain Administration will at least be a “step forward” from the Bush Administration when it comes to the environment, whereas an Obama Administration will eventually result in a nearly complete reversal of the current Administration's stance on environmental policy. Stay tuned during the fall and, of course, for the 4 years thereafter – Act One will open in Copenhagen, at the UN Climate Conference in early 2009. Wed, 01 Oct 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2041573371 Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment climate_policy_general presidential_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2009.270204 Following the end of their government coalition with the Social Democratic Party, German Green Party leaders spoke of "a dawn of new opportunities" for Alliance 90/The Greens. They wanted to capitalize on the strategic opportunities afforded by Germany's new five-party system and on the unexpected rise of climate change in public debate. Shortly before the 2009 federal election, however, the party's "new opportunities" seem rather limited. Selectively focusing on one particular explanatory factor, this article contrasts the Green's neo-radical eco-political position as it has emerged since 2005 with the ways in which environmental issues are addressed by the currently popular LOHAS (Life of Health and Sustainability) consumer movement. It suggests that the German Greens may have paid too little attention to the ongoing reframing of the environmental issue in public discourse and that this has impaired their prospects for a swift return to government office. Mon, 01 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2070393810 German Politics & Society green_subsidy national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsu003 The commons is increasingly viewed as an alternative to private and state regulation. Green Parties and the wider green movement understand the commons in diverse ways as a means of environmental governance that helps us deal with climate change and other ecological threats. However, the commons as a self-managed institution cannot be legislated into existence. This article discusses the extent to which Green Parties can promote the commons, and is dedicated to the late Vincent Ostrom. Vincent Ostrom was concerned with how alternative property rights could promote environmental sustainability from the 1950s onwards. This article will examine how his work can be used to advance green politics and the pursuit of a republican commons. Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2099853089 Community Development Journal climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.24135/tekaharoa.v7i1.47 Entering the new year of 2014 the Kingdom of Tonga had enough to worry about; a local economy choking to near death and a finance minister sacked and replaced in a political spectacle leaving the public baffled over what went wrong between him and the Prime Minister (Fayle, 2014; Lopeti, 2014c; Fonua, 2014b). People uttered they looked forward to the end of year election tentatively set for Thursday November 27th. The 2010 register of around forty thousand voters had increased at the 2014 intake by four thousand, mostly voters who had turned the age of suffrage at twenty one years old. The chorus call from the masses was simple, vote them out. Then Cyclone Ian struck on Saturday 11 January 2014 aggravating Tonga’s money shortage. Journalist Pesi Fonua wrote “the impact on the Tongan economy of the cyclone and the salary rise for civil servants at this point of time is a matter of great concern” (Fonua, 2014a). He was right. The state and taxpayers could not afford economic recovery from Tonga’s cruellest cyclone, a symptom of climate change, let alone paying for a 5% rise in the cost of living allowance for public servants. As the national debt distress sore became inflamed the Public Service Association decided it was the right time to fight cabinet for a 22% living allowance rise because 5% was not enough (Lopeti, 2014a). This essay asks a pointed question. Leading up to the general election of November 2014, how was cyclone politicking being manoeuvred to sway the way people would vote? Wed, 08 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2127159176 Te Kaharoa extreme_weather national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.175 The release of Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and his subsequent training of thousands of Climate Presenters marks a critical transition point in communication around climate change. An analysis of Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth presentation and of the guidelines we were taught as Presenters in The Climate Project, show they reflect the marketing principles that the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) report Weathercocks and Signposts (Crompton) argues cannot achieve the systemic and transformational changes required to address global warming. This paper will consider the ultimate effectiveness of social marketing approaches to Climate change communication and the Al Gore Climate Project in the light of the WWF critique. Both the film and the various slideshow presentations of An Inconvenient Truth conclude with a series of suggestions about how to “how to start” changing “the way you live.” The audience is urged to: Reduce your own emissions Switch to green power Offset the rest Spread the word The focus on changing individual consumption in An Inconvenient Truth is also reflected in the climate campaign page Get Involved on the website of the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF)—the Australian partner in Al Gore’s The Climate Project (TCP). Al Gore’s Climate Project, with over 3,000 Climate Presenters worldwide, could be seen as a giant experimental test of the merits of marketing approaches to social change as compared to the recommendations in the WWF critique authored by Crompton. In Orion magazine, Derrick Jensen has described this emphasis on “personal consumption” instead of “organized political resistance” as “a campaign of systematic misdirection.” Jensen points out that “even if every person in the United States did everything the movie suggested, U.S. carbon emissions would fall by only 22 percent.” The latest scientific reports show we are on the edge of a tipping point into catastrophic climate change—runaway warming which would render the planet uninhabitable for most life forms, including humans (Hansen et al 13). To reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change to a still worrying 13% we need significant action between now and 2012, and carbon dioxide levels will need to be stabilised at between 350 and 375 parts per million by 2050 (Elzen and Meinshausen 17). Because Americans and Australians are taking far more than our share of the global atmospheric commons, we need to reduce our emissions to less than 90% below 1990 levels by 2050 as our share of the global emission reduction targets (Elzen and Meinshausen 24; Garnaut 283). In other words, if one takes the science seriously there is a huge shortfall between the reductions which can be achieved by individual changes to consumption and the scale of reductions that are required to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change to a half-way tolerable level. The actions being promoted as solutions are nowhere near “inconvenient” enough to solve the problem. Like Crompton and Jensen I was inclined to take the gap between goal and means as overwhelming evidence for the inadequacy of marketing approaches emphasising changes to individual consumption choices. Like them I was concerned that the emphasis on consumption in marketing approaches may even reinforce the consumerism and materialism that drives the growth in emissions. Whilst being generally critical of marketing approaches, Crompton says he accepts the importance marketers place on tailoring the message to fit the motivations of the target audience (25). However, while Crompton describes Rose and Dade’s “Values Modes analysis” as “a sophisticated technique for audience segmentation” (21), he rejects the campaign strategies designed around the target audiences they identify (23). Market segmentation provides communications practitioners with the “extensive knowledge of whom you are trying to reach and what moves them” which is one of the “three must haves” of a successful communication campaign (Fenton 3). Rose and Dade’s segmentation analysis categorises people based on the motivational hierarchy in Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. They identify three population groupings—the Settlers, driven by security; the Prospectors, esteem driven; and the Pioneers, who are motivated by intrinsic values (1). As with Maslow’s hierarchy these “Values Modes” are developmentally dynamic. The satisfaction of more basic needs, like physical safety and economic security, support a developmental pathway to the next level. Just as the satisfaction of the need for social acceptance and status free the individual to become motivated by self-actualisation, universal and compassionate ethics, and transcendence. Because individuals move in and out of Values Modes, depending on the degree to which economic, social and political conditions facilitate the satisfaction of their needs, the percentage of the population in each group varies across time and location (Rose and Dade 1). In 2007 the UK population was 20% Settlers, 40% Prospectors, and 40% Pioneers (Rose and Dade 1), but the distribution in other countries would need to be determined empirically. Rose et al provide a strategic rationale for a marketing based climate campaign targeted at changing the behaviours of Prospectors, rather than appealing to Pioneers. While the Pioneers are 40% of the population, they don’t like being “marketed at,” they seek out information for themselves and make up their own minds, and “will often have already considered your ideas and decided what to do” (6). They are also well catered for by environmental groups’ existing ethical and issues based campaigns (3). Prospectors, on the other hand, are the 40% of the population which are the “least reached” by existing ethical or issues oriented environmental campaigning; are the most enthusiastic (or “voracious”) consumers, so their choices will sway business; and they tend to be swinging voters, so if their opinions change it will sway politicians (4). Rose et al (13) found that in order to appeal to Prospectors a climate change communications campaign should: Refer to local, visible, negative changes involving loss or damage [In the UK] show the significance of UK emissions and those of normal people (i.e. like them) Use interest in homes and gardens Deploy the nag factor of their children Create offers which are above all easy, cost-effective, instant and painless Prospectors don’t like, and will be put off by campaigns that (Rose et al 13): Talk about the implications: too remote and they are not very bothered Use messengers (voices) which lack authority or could be challenged Criticise behaviours (e.g. wrong type of car, ‘wasting’ energy in your home) Ask them to give things up Ask them to be the first to change (amongst their peers) Invoke critical judgement by others Crompton recommends an environmental campaign that attempts to persuade Prospectors that they are wrong in thinking material consumption and “ostentatious displays of wealth” contribute to their happiness. Prospectors see precisely these sorts of comments by Concerned Ethicals as a judgemental criticism of their love of things, and a denial of their need for the acceptance and approval of others. Maslow’s developmental model, as well as the Value Modes research, would suggest that Crompton’s proposal is the exact opposite of what is required to move Prospectors into the Pioneer value mode. It is by accepting the values people have, and allowing them to meet the needs that drive them, that they can move on to more intrinsically motivated action. Crompton would appear to fall into the common “NGO or public sector campaign […] trap” of devising a campaign based on what will appeal to the 10% of the population that are Concerned Ethicals, but in the process “particularly annoy or intimidate” the strategically significant 40% of the population that are Prospectors (Rose et al 8). Crompton ignores the evidence from marketing campaign research that campaigns can’t directly change people’s basic motivations, while they can change people’s behaviours if they target their existing motivations. Contrary to Crompton’s claim that promoting green consumption will reinforce consumerism and materialism (16), Rose and Dade base their campaign strategy on the results of research into cognitive dissonance, which show that if you can get someone to act a certain way, they will alter their beliefs and preferences, as well as their self concept, to fit with their actions. Crompton confuses a tactic in a larger game, with the end goal of the game. “The trick is to get them to do the behaviour, not to develop the opinion” (Rose, “VBCOP” 2). Prospectors are persuaded to adopt a behaviour if they see it as “in,” and as what everyone else like them is doing. They are more easily persuaded to buy a product than adopt some other sort of behavioural change. The next part of an environmental marketing strategy like this is to label, praise and reward the behaviour (Futerra 11). Rose suggests that Prospectors can be engaged politically if governments are called on to recognise and reward the behaviour “say by giving them a tax break or paying them for their rooftop energy contribution” (“VBCOP” 3). Once governments have given such rewards, both Settlers and Propectors will fight to keep them, where they are normally disinclined to fight political battles. Once Prospectors identify themselves as, for example, in favour of renewable energy, politicians can be persuaded they need to act to get and keep votes, and business can be persuaded to change in order to continue to attract buyers for their products. In order to achieve the scale of emission reductions required individuals need to change their consumption patterns; politicians need to change the regulatory and planning context in which both individual and corporate decisions are made; and the economic system Fri, 28 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2137906467 M/C Journal climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Recent news reports about different aspects of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) have proven wrong the well-worn saying that there’s no such thing as bad publicity. The government’s First Biennial Report to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change indicated that the scheme has had little effect on domestic emissions compared to a modelled “without measures” scenario and this will continue under current policy settings. The forest industry has reported that low and uncertain emission prices have created little incentive for new forest planting and posed little barrier to deforestation relative to competing drivers. In mid-May, arbitrage by NZ ETS participants at apparent taxpayer expense created headlines as the government acted abruptly to halt reregistration arbitrage by post-1989 forestry participants (see an earlier blog on this topic). This caused an outcry among stakeholders because they were not consulted and the full arbitrage problem was not solved. At the end of May, the Iwi Leaders Group announced intentions to file a Treaty of Waitangi claim stemming from low emission prices which have impacted on the value of Treaty settlements. At the beginning of June, the Green Party announced its new climate change policy, calling for the complete replacement of the NZ ETS with a broad carbon tax whose revenue would be returned to the economy through tax relief to households and businesses. As a country, we seem to be missing a common vision for New Zealand’s pathway toward a global low-emission future and the role of emission pricing. The NZ ETS was intended to expose the economy to a price on emissions, thereby driving cost-efficient emission reductions, influencing investments in long-lived capital and land use and reducing our future vulnerability to rising international carbon prices and stranded assets. Instead, under weak settings, the emission pricing beacon of the NZ ETS has been obscured in the fog of growing policy uncertainty around whether New Zealand truly intends to reduce its emissions and who will bear the costs. Until this fog lifts, market players will not want to move ahead with investments that could be placed at risk by future policy changes. To be successful, a price on emissions needs to be expected to remain high enough for long enough to shift investment decisions. Under an ETS, for emission units to be valued by the market and generate a price signal, participants need to face a limited supply of units which is underpinned by confidence in the rules governing the use of units. These conditions have not been sustained in New Zealand’s carbon market and the resultant low price signal has not produced much mitigation. While shifting from a weak ETS to an ambitious carbon tax is one approach for generating a more effective and reliable emission price signal, it is not the only approach. It would come at a high cost from the design of, and transition to, a new tax regime and the disposition of assets created under the NZ ETS. Ultimately, the level of mitigation and price certainty produced by the carbon tax would depend on the process chosen to adjust its ambition over time; this would be subject to the same political uncertainty that has led to problems in the NZ ETS. A rough transition between pricing mechanisms could further erode private-sector confidence in government commitment to policy. The fundamental purpose and architecture of the NZ ETS remain sound. The current problems result largely from failures to adapt the scheme efficiently to changing conditions, follow a consultative process when changing government rules impacting on private investments, and above all, demonstrate clear policy commitment to a rising long-term domestic price on emissions. The existing NZ ETS architecture could be adapted to provide both increased price ambition and price certainty under a domestic-only scheme while retaining the option for New Zealand to easily rejoin a future, well-functioning international market for emission units recognised under international agreements. For example, a clearly binding limit on units available to the domestic market between now and 2020 would push prices up toward the current ceiling of $25. Alternatively, requiring a fixed payment per unit, possibly as well as surrender of units, would push the emission price up, effectively creating a temporary tax within the existing structure. A more rapid phase-out of free allocation and consequent auction of surplus ETS units could generate revenue that could be recycled into the economy, similar to a carbon tax. Concerns about the current distributional consequences of an emission price could be addressed without changing the whole policy and further undermining confidence in the direction of policy and the value of investments that will shift our economy in fundamental ways. The suggestion to rethink our approach to emission pricing, increase ambition and improve price certainty is a useful one. We could choose to build on the existing foundations of the NZ ETS rather than start from scratch with a new mechanism. Using inclusive consultative processes to shape the country’s future climate change mitigation pathway and provide longer-term policy certainty on emission pricing with cross-party support would help to restore public trust and stimulate the kind of investments that will prepare New Zealand to compete effectively in a global low-emission future. Note: This article first appeared in the Motu Research Update for June 2014. You can subscribe using this link. Mon, 23 Jun 2014 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2151416248 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe carbon_tax national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers As this Saturday's election edges closer, voters say they're interested in seeing where the candidates stand on renewable energy. Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W216227037 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe solar_energy local_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Issues associated with enquiries into science are addressed. Issues include the need to establish an analytical framework before information is collected that takes account of the potential for multiple causes of global warming, and to separately address the preferred means of remediation. Introduction During the 2010 election campaign the 'in limbo' Australian Government announced a policy to conduct a commission to enquire into the science of climate change (a Commission of Enquiry). This received no public attention apart from two newspaper articles identifying the establishment of a Climate Change Commission to educate the public on climate change. This Climate Change Commission was to comprise five 'experts' on climate change. The salaries of the suggested experts were identified as being in the mid range for highest level in public service salaries. The change in focus from enquiring into science to promoting existing views, and the concern for salaries, indicates that the policy had been hijacked by senior bureaucrats. The new Department of Climate Change had mainly been staffed by economists employed to develop a carbon Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Compared with other Australian Government Departments a large number of positions were at very senior levels. The abandonment of an Australian ETS by both major parties resulted in many senior public servants having no foreseeable role. The lack of an operational Government during the election period was evidently seen as providing an opportunity to establish an entrenched position that benefited them. Promotion of CO2 as being the cause of climate change boosted their chances of being able to implement the planned ETS. The main feature of the 2010 election was the lack of clear policies to address climate change when climate change was THE prime concern of voters. The Labour Party dismissed introducing an ETS, in the initial part of the election campaign at least, when the introduction of an ETS was the prime plank in their platform for the 2007 election. During the period between the 2007 and 2010 elections the Liberal Party changed positions from support for an ETS to NO ETS or carbon tax. In this period The Greens changed from supporting an ETS to advocating a carbon tax, at least as an interim measure prior to the introduction of an ETS. The change in the position of the Labour Party followed the 'failure' of the United Nations sponsored Copenhagen meeting on climate change. The change in the position of the Liberal Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2184496808 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe emissions_trading national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers This paper contributes to such assessment by using the explanatory power of the ecopolitical theories of ecological modernisation, the intergenerational value change of postmaterialism, and consumer and citizens’ preferences, to study consequences of the GFC in three nations: Australia, New Zealand and Spain. How elites discursively constructed climate change issues during the crisis, election results, and public opinion survey data are studied. Ecopolitical theory only developed as a cohesive school of thought in the late 1960s, and the severity of the GFC provides an opportunity to examine those theories that relate to economic circumstances. Ecopolitical theory helps understand how environmental problems can be managed within the political process. First the background of the GFC and climate change policy in the three case countries is examined. This is followed by a brief explanation of the three ecopolitical theories, ecological modernisation, postmaterialism, and consumer and citizen’s preferences. Then each case country is examined in regard to linguistic framing of events and political decisions taken during the GFC. This is followed by discussion and conclusions relating the findings for the three countries. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2184955121 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers This article assesses the conditions of partisan influence on public policy change, by comparing the action of the German and French Greens with regard to energy during their participation in the ''Red-Green'' (1998-2005) and ''Plural Left'' (1997-2002) coalitions, respectively. First, it highlights the importance of the institutional context in which political parties operate. In Germany, both political and sector-specific institutions made it possible for Die Grunen to have a stronger and deeper impact on energy policy than Les Verts. Second, it emphasizes the strategic and relational dimensions of partisan influence. The ability of the German Green party to foster contacts with the renewable energy industry and experts also explains its policy impact and the success of its strategy focusing on specific issues during its participation in government. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2189011093 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Climate change politics in Australia has been defined by incendiary rhetoric and increasing public disillusionment. Debate has been slipping into the partisan arena of the “culture wars”. Social democrats can learn from the Australian experience, which underlines the need to move away from cosmopolitan ethics and towards muscular nation-building. Climate change action requires broad coalitions of support and an acknowledgement that reform will be costly. In 2007, staking his claim to become prime minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd famously described climate change as “the greatest moral, economic and social challenge of our time.” Climate change was, for Rudd, one of his defining concerns as opposition leader. If the Labor Party were elected, it would ratify the Kyoto Protocol and introduce an emissions trading scheme (ETS). A Rudd Labor Government wouldn’t be waiting for the rest of the world to act on climate change; it would ensure Australia was leading it. Some three years later, Rudd is indeed Australian prime minister. His government’s first formal act was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Yet Rudd’s attempts to introduce an ETS have thus far failed. Once a sure vote-winner for Rudd and Labor, climate change has now become something of an electoral yoke. The public mood has shifted. Bipartisan support for an ETS has disappeared, with the replacement of former Howard environment minister Malcolm Turnbull as the leader of the Liberal-National opposition. The new leader, Tony Abbott, a well-known climate sceptic, has gained considerable political traction by dismissing an ETS as just “a great big new tax.” The Rudd Government, once so sure-footed on climate change matters, is now reluctant to fight the next general election on the issue. Australia may, on the face of things, appear an atypical case study for social democrats seeking to recapture the political initiative on climate change. After all, the fortunes of the Australian economy are tied to fossil fuels: primary commodities including coal and natural gas account for the bulk of merchandise export income. During the last decade Chinese demand for raw materials has fuelled a resources boom that will continue for decades and whose windfall is expected to be the largest of its kind ever. Moreover, the climate change debate in Australia has had something of an exceptionalist character. For it has been arguably subsumed into the so-called “culture wars” that have raged in Australia in recent years. Although a majority of Australians believe in anthropogenic climate change, some of the language of climate change scepticism has been expressed in the familiar cadences of rightwing populism. With echoes of previous debates about the Australian republic, multiculturalism and Aboriginal reconciliation, the scientists who compose the body of the IPCC are portrayed as pernicious, rent-seeking “elites” attempting to capture the state. The so-called “climategate” incident involving leaked emails from the University of East Anglia’s Climatic Research Unit, and the controversy surrounding the IPCC’s findings about the melting of ice glaciers, have only lent credence to accusations of elite scientific conspiracy. Yet one shouldn’t dismiss the Australian experience on account of its peculiarities. In various ways, it reveals a good deal about the underlying challenges for progressives elsewhere. On the one hand, Australia’s vulnerability is a reminder of the truly grave threat global warming poses to biodiversity and ecosystems. The Great Barrier Reef, for example, has experienced unprecedented bleaching over the last twenty years. Rising temperatures could mean that the kind of firestorms that engulfed Victoria that Black Saturday of 7 February 2009 will become more common. On the other hand, the political journey of the Rudd Government highlights the pitfalls of climate change reform. For all of Rudd’s belief in the urgency of climate change action, he has failed thus far to score a decisive reform victory. This is because his Government hasn’t yet convinced voters that structural reform demands hard choices, nor has it offered a compelling political narrative about climate change action. In this paper, we outline three lessons progressives can draw from Australia’s climate change debate: (1) that the task of structural reform necessarily incurs high costs; (2) that the case for climate change action is more persuasive when supported by a nation-building story; and (3) that the politics of climate change require progressives to build broad coalitions of support. Mon, 07 Jun 2010 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2201832242 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe emissions_trading national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Environmental issues appear to be poised to become a major political issue in the coming years, due to fears over global climate change. How will such issues influence the voting behavior of Americans? We explore citizen attitudes on environmentalism to determine whether such issues influence voting in presidential elections. We find that partisanship and ideology are becoming increasingly linked to voter attitudes towards the environment, but that at current, environmentalism has little impact on presidential voting. We test the theories of Judis and Teixeira (2002) that the emergence of postmaterial issues such as the environment will primarily benefit the Democratic Party. We find some evidence that the post-material thesis theory is correct. Highly educated professionals who are either Democrats or independents and who can correctly place the candidates on environmental issues in 2000 and 2004 were significantly more likely to vote Democratic. In contrast, however, under the same specification, Republicans are much more likely to remain with their party’s candidate even when they hold moderate views on the environment. These finding suggest that the rise of environmentalism may lead to continued polarization between the parties even as a new issue rises to prominence. Thu, 12 Apr 2007 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2219947065 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe climate_policy_general presidential_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers The Gillard government is confident that voters will soon forget the carbon tax that started on Sunday. But many people will be hit with a double whammy when they see their electricity bills. Sun, 01 Jul 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2248397083 Eureka street carbon_tax national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers The author discusses the future of the Emissions Trading Scheme from the perspective of the two most critical global crises, climate change and the economic recession. The focus is on the 'Green New Deal', a concept that has formed the core of the Green Party ideology since the 1960s. The initiative aims to rebuild the global economy based on the four pillars of renewable energy, energy efficiency, clean alternative transport and protection of ecosystems. Senator Christine Milne addressed The Sydney Institute on Monday 27 October 2008 to discuss the way forward for the Emissions Trading Scheme in the context of twin global meltdowns of climate and finance. Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2248520248 Sydney Papers, The emissions_trading national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Many reasons have been put forward for John Howard's failure to win the 2007 election - negative reaction to Work- Choices, his refusal to abdicate in favour of Peter Costello, even a sense that he had just been in power too long - but there was another issue which suffused the Opposition campaign and which played a major part in persuading voters: climate change, in particular the recent drought. John Howard may be the first leader in the modern world to be voted out of office partly because he failed to make it rain. Mon, 01 Sep 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2257567839 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe extreme_weather national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2016.v5n1p125 Abstract : The pressure on EU countries to abandon a leadership role on sustainable development and climate change politics is growing. However, no other source of global leadership is emerging that could fill the gap. The present analysis examines the relative role of four political drivers that influence policy and governance responsesto global environmental issues.The conclusion is that over the last two decades,international negotiations, civil society activism, and private sector initiatives on their own have not been decisive factorsshaping outcomes whilepolitical opportunity structures in key countries explain broad policy trajectories that favor or undermine sustainable development policies. EU countries - where Green Parties at times have been able to critically shape policy direction - are the only actors that have developed the socio-political and economic foundation for a coherent approach to sustainable development. Such a foundation on the other hand is missing in the United States and in key emerging economies. Key words: Sustainable development, climate change, global environmentalism, EU leadership, U.S. climate politics Mon, 01 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2262861022 European Journal of Sustainable Development climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.17953/appc.11.1-2.r4508806v313n401 Over the past twenty years, the Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN) has engaged in innovative strategies for building grassroots leadership in Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) communities to bring important perspectives to the movement for environmental justice.Founded in 1993, APEN strategies include community organizing and leadership development, policy development and advocacy, multiracial movement building, and, most recently, electoral organizing and civic engagement to affect state climate and energy policy.This article reflects on lessons learned in organizing to elevate the power of AAPIs to influence the public debates over the environment and influence public policy that affects where AAPIs live, work, play, and go to school.We focus on a case study of the successful defeat of Proposition 23, a California ballot initiative that would have suspended the nation's toughest state-level greenhouse gas emissions program and point to the increasing role and power of AAPIs in determining state and national climate policy.For organizers, policy makers, and environmental advocates in particular, the campaign illustrates the importance of integrating an electoral strategy with community organizing work to educate and turn out voters to advance progressive environmental policy change.Lessons from APEN's twenty years illustrate the past and current role of AAPIs in environmental activism and policy and the strategies necessary to tap demographic changes in order to strengthen a comprehensive strategy to combat climate change, 140 aapi nexus accelerate the development of an equitable clean energy economy, and ensure a livable planet for future generations. Sun, 01 Sep 2013 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2287869351 AAPI Nexus Policy Practice and Community emissions_trading national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers This brief report draws upon data from a nationally representative survey conducted in March 2012 (Climate Change in the American Mind) and other research to investigate the question: On balance, will candidates for political office benefit or be harmed by talking about and supporting action to reduce global warming? The short answer is that ‐ at the national level and among ten key swing states ‐ taking a proclimate stand appears to benefit candidates more than hurt them with registered voters. Of course, the political dynamics in any given district may be an exception to this pattern, but it is important to note that the pattern is similar at both the national and swing-state scales. A few highlights: Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2323214493 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe climate_policy_general incumbent_support journal_article https://doi.org/10.1177/2046147x13494966 The primary aim of this research was to explore whether the conceptual framework for intentional positioning in public relations proposed by James in 2010–11, which is underpinned by positioning theory, could be used to guide a discourse analysis of strategic positioning tactics. Positioning discourse analysis is designed to examine how discourse is being used to strategically position something in order to gain an advantage, or to achieve a goal in a public relations context. In this study, a sample of speeches by the two leading politicians in Australia on the topic of carbon pricing was analysed. Both politicians worked to position a carbon price/tax as good and bad for Australia respectively. Guided by James’s framework, the positioning goal, positioning type and positioning purpose were identified along with the discursive strategies used. However, one of the positions was not as strongly held in the public debate as the other. Applying positioning theory, it could be seen that although other factors in the strategy and tactics were basically sound, it could also be argued that the right to position in a certain way had not been sufficiently established in the opinion of Australian voters. Undertaking a positioning discourse analysis offers another way of examining practice and sheds more light on the role of discourse in strategic public relations. This was a small study with generally encouraging findings that indicate further testing of the method is warranted. Sun, 01 Sep 2013 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2330344974 Public Relations Inquiry carbon_tax national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1350/clwr.2014.43.3.0269 This article examines the use of financial services law (securities regulation) to regulate and to reduce emissions trading to reduce the causes of climate change—with reference to Australia's use of financial services law from 2012. The Australian financialization model, introduced by the previous Australian (Australian Labor Party) government, is planned to be repealed in mid-2014 (depending on votes in the upper house of the Australian parliament) by the conservative (Liberal-National Party coalition) government as its ‘first order of business’. At the time of writing in April 2014, the carbon price is in full operation. The government won office in September 2013, partly in the wake of an electoral backlash against the ‘carbon tax’. Australia's climate change model was based on defining emission reduction units as financial products under the Corporations Act, which resulted in the regulation of the market for trading emissions reductions becoming the responsibility of the financial services regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. This article examines the financial services model which treats emissions as financial products, regulated by financial services laws which provide inter alia for trading on regulated markets, the licensing of advisers, the expectation of high standards for secondary trading, the recognition of consumer rights under consumer laws and the continuous disclosure of information to financial markets. Fri, 22 Aug 2014 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2330550506 Common Law World Review emissions_trading national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Climate change is a serious threat to the continued existence of human civilization. Despite this, the United States has yet to pass meaningful legislation to cub greenhouse gas emissions. Although tackling environmental issues once had a broad bipartisan support, the issue of climate change has driven a wedge between Democratic and Republican voters and politicians. Consequently, the United States finds itself deadlocked in the political sphere, unable to come together on any real strategies to adapt to the realities of a changing world. The driving force behind the lack of American action on climate change is the persistence of denial. Climate change denial appeals to those who hold a privileged position in American society. They see climate action as threatening to their lifestyle and thus have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Corporate interests with high carbon emissions have had great success partnering with conservative white males in a union of the privileged elite to form a coalition of denial. Climate change denial has been skillfully developed by fossil-fuel interests and has come to dominate the environmental policy of the Republican party. Analyzing a history of the environmental movement in the United States, this thesis examines the climate change denial movement’s origins. It also considers the psychological reasons climate change denial has taken root among the privileged. It then considers the 2016 United States political climate to demonstrate how entrenched denial has become in the lead-up to the presidential election. Finally, this thesis proposes deniers can be taught to support action on climate change by giving them a more thorough understanding of nature at a young age and then showing them that climate change threatens the Earth with which they have developed a deep attachment. Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2350295484 Fordham Research Commons (Fordham University) climate_policy_general presidential_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers This article examines trust in environmental organisations as sources of information on climate change, in light of the highly charged political debate in Australia. Trust is understood in terms of expectations of others' behaviour and is underwritten by various sources of legitimacy. A total of 1355 respondents were surveyed in 2010 and again in 2011, allowing tests for significant changes over time to be conducted. The results showed a decrease in belief in climate change, and a decrease in trust in environmental organisations, which was slightly greater for those who voted for opposition parties. Over the same period, overall trust in government scientists did not change, although significant increases and decreases were found on the basis of voting behaviour. Changes in trust suggest that the reputations of environmental organisations, in particular, are being tarnished, and that these organisations may need to increase their attention to legitimising strategies. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2467863477 Third sector review climate_policy_general incumbent_support journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers This dissertation focuses on the politics and potential effects of climate change on political systems. I examine aspects of three broad questions. First, how might future climatic stressors alter the stability of political systems? Numerous studies investigate this question through the lens of conflict. Yet most political change does not arise through violent upheaval. In democratic nations at least, most political change arises through regular elections. In my first chapter, I examine the potential for climate change to disrupt the functioning of political systems through alterations in political behaviors at the ballot box. I find that -- if historical relationships persist -- the climatic distributions projected for the latter part of this century may increase rates of democratic turnover, especially in poorer nations with already weaker democratic institutions. My second question relates to the political feasibility of policies designed to address climatic changes in lower income democracies. In my second chapter, I investigate the willingness of voters and politicians in Sub-Saharan Africa to lend political support to climate change policies. Evidence from these studies suggests that voters are reticent to support climate policies and that politicians are reluctant to pursue climate policies. My third question focuses on the behavioral motivations for taking individual political action to address climate change. Organizations looking to motivate action on climate change often make appeals that emphasize an individual's personal responsibility for the problem, with the notion that emphasizing diffuse collective responsibility may diminish individual action. In my third chapter, I conduct a series of survey experiments with members from the National Audubon Society and from the general public and find that -- contrary to expectations -- emphasizing personal responsibility produces no significant increase in climate change action whereas emphasizing collective responsibility amplifies climate action. These three chapters represent a foray into vital areas of my future research program: the potential effects of climate change on political systems, the political feasibility of climate policies, and the underpinnings of political behaviors related to climate change. Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2473727293 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers The Australian Labor and Liberal Parties' failure to create an effective policy to tackle climate change is criticised. The author argues that environmental issues are ignored as the two major parties are influenced by big business and the Green Party focuses more on its political power sharing agenda. Mon, 01 Mar 2010 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2537823652 Eureka street climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.3390/en9121000 As the leader of the largest economy, President of the United States has substantive influence on addressing climate change problems. However, a presidential election is often dominated by issues other than energy problems. This paper focuses on the 2016 presidential election, and examines the energy plans proposed by the leading Democrat and Republican candidates. Our data from the Iowa caucus survey in January 2016 suggests that voters were more concerned about terrorism and economic issues than environmental issues. We then compare the Democratic and Republican candidate’s view of America’s energy future, and evaluate their proposed renewable energy targets. We find that the view on renewable energy is polarized between Democratic and Republican candidates, while candidates from both parties agree on the need for energy efficiency. Results from our ordinal least squares regression models suggests that Democratic candidates have moderate to ambitious goals for developing solar and other renewables. The Republican candidates favor fossil fuels and they choose not to provide any specific target for developing renewable energy. In addition, this trend of party polarization has grown more significant when compared with the past three presidential elections. Our observation suggests that energy policies need to be discussed more often regarding the diversification and decarbonization of the nation’s energy system. Wed, 30 Nov 2016 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2558473621 Energies green_subsidy presidential_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers [Extract] Through 2011 and 2012 the Australian Labor Party has slouched its way towards electoral oblivion. The lack of legitimacy of its leader, Julia Gillard, is a factor in this lemming-like stagger to the abyss. She was elected on a lie, and the voters have never forgiven her. "There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead" were eleven of the most toxic words any Australian political leader has ever uttered. Gillard's political judgment in office has proved to be just as suspect. Her original fib turned into a government of feint, sham and pretence. The downward spiral that began with her brazen reneging on the election promise not to introduce a tax on carbon dioxide reached its nadir with her indecorous embrace of various pungent members of parliament. Yet for all that, the two Labor leaders who preceded her were no less dysfunctional. For the ALP to have suffered one hopeless leader was bad luck; but three in a row was a pattern. It suggested something deeper at work. Sat, 01 Sep 2012 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2596717525 ResearchOnline - JCU (James Cook University) carbon_tax national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.7282/t3h70j4k This thesis is applied microeconomics in climate change and environmental economics. Climate scientists express strong consensus on anthropogenic climate change. Although science is based on "hard facts", there have been cases where scientists have been found to misrepresent data, or to hide relevant facts. Since politicians in general have no scientific background and they often suspect that scientific data could be misrepresented or manipulated, it is worthwhile to study the strategic interaction between a climate scientist and a politician who suspects the scientist may be manipulating the data. This thesis is a rigorous analysis of these controversial topics by applying formal game-theoretic models and empirical techniques. In Chapter 2, I develop a cheap-talk game of the three parties associated with climate change: the government, the climate scientist, and the median voter. I show that a credibility gap is created between the scientist and the government if the preference of the scientist is not perfectly aligned with that of the government. In the case where climate change is likely to be a serious problem, the credibility gap leads to too much burning of fossil fuels. The credibility gap is eliminated and the ex-ante social welfare is maximized if and only if the scientist's preference is perfectly aligned with that of the government. This is endogenously achieved when the government is allowed to appoint its optimal scientist without election concerns. In the case where the government has election concerns, if the median voter perceives an alarming message from the climate scientist, then even a "right-wing" government must choose an aggressive climate change policy to avoid losing the election. Accordingly, it will prefer to appoint a climate scientist who is unlikely to send an alarming message. Thus the government deliberately creates a credibility gap which may cause distorted climate change policies in a democratic society. Nevertheless, the model predicts that countries with more democratic political institutions will have climate change policies that are more targeted towards renewable energy. In Chapter 3, I test this theoretical prediction. In the analysis of international panel data of 1980-2012, I find that a one-unit increase in the Polity II index is associated with approximately 11-13 percent increase in the proportion of electricity due to renewable energy. I also find that a one-unit increase in the Polity II index is associated with approximately 3 percent decrease in the CO2 emissions per capita. That is, countries with more democratic institutions practice more environment-friendly policies; and they also produce lower CO2 emissions. I further study how the population environmental preferences, as measured by the LCV scores, influence state governors to become more concerned about the environment. From a U.S. panel data in the period of 1971-2007, I find the Republican state governors increase the environmental expenditure per capita by approximately 1.5 percent as the Democrat LCV scores increase by 1 percent; and they increase the environmental expenditure per capita by 4.8 percent as the Republican LCV scores decrease by 1 percent. That is, Republican governors respond positively to the LCV scores of the Democrats, but not to Republican LCV scores. In Chapter 4, I extend the strategy of manipulating conflict developed by Baliga and Sj¨ostr¨om (2012) and apply it to climate-change politics between two asymmetric decision-makers under incomplete information. The decision-makers choose progressive or conservative actions towards climate change. A decision-maker from a country with greater damage from climate change is more likely to be progressive than a country with lesser damage. Climate scientists can manipulate this decision-making by sending publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The likelihood of both players choosing progressive action on climate change decreases if both players are “coordination” types and the scientist is conservative. The conservative scientist can cause this by sending skeptical messages that trigger a spiral of climate change skepticism. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If both players are opportunistic types, a progressive scientist can send alarming messages that cause the decision-maker from the country with greater damage from climate change to be more progressive. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. I show that there does not exist any communication equilibrium for either kind of scientist, for any other combination of player types. Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2603539368 Climate Policy and Voting Behaviour in Europe climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Overseeing the Australian election campaign one could conclude that it truly was a battle to the very end, in which there was an unruly sense of tension and anticipation in the air as 14 million citizens were called to cast their compulsory vote on 21st of August, for the 27th Prime Minister of Australia. The true encounter held between the two traditional front running parties that possessed two flawed leaders. The ALP (Australian Labor Party) the centre left party, who held power from 2007- 2010, faced a recent internal crisis not seen since 1991, a  party room coup . The previous Prime Minister Kevin Rudd sworn in, in 2007 was over thrown on the 23rd of June 2010 due to months of dramatic losses in public support and key factions required to sustain his leadership. Key decisions made by the leader such as the controversial resource super profits tax, the global emissions trading scheme, endless broken promises and extravagant spending, all contributed enormously in the decline of voter’s approval towards the leader. Consequently this descending dissatisfaction caused severe instability within the party itself and resulted in communication of an internal leadership ballot that would be held by the Labor party caucus, forcing a choice to be made of whether to continue behind Rudd’s reign as leader, or choose Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard as their representative. Rudd was beaten by a landslide and overnight Gillard replaced him, becoming the first female Prime Minister of Australia. She held this temporary role into the elections for eight weeks and three days while also holding the position of actual contender, representing the Labor Party for the honourable title. After this replacement she commented on various occasions that she could not truly consider herself Prime Minister until she was voted so democratically by the people. The LPA (Liberal Party of Australia) is the self proclaimed centre right party; who demonstrated far more stability as a whole during the campaign although its leader Tony Abbott was highly questioned. Abbott, a previous Minister for Employment Services, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations & Minister for Health and Aging came to be leader of the Liberals in December of 2009. Voting took place between Malcolm Turnbull (ex Minister for Environment and Water Resource) and himself for the role, as the previous leader (ex Prime Minister John Howard) refused to go into another election. After Howard’s departure and refusal to run for another election, Abbott won the previously mentioned internal elections by only one point and thus was chosen to lead the party into the 2010 elections. As the elections were called rather abruptly after the crumbling of the Labor Party, both parties were forced to present strong and structured strategies on their ideas for the growth and prosperity of the nation. The main issues on debate were climate change, economic management, taxation, population policy, asylum seekers, health, and the national broadband network. The Labor Party focused its agenda on “moving Australia forward” as their slogan stated by “talking to the Australian people in this campaign about how our nation can seize the opportunities of the future. Gillard and her team claimed this was possible through: a health reform, advancing the national health and hospital system; “a tax plan for our future” entailing the reinvestment of profits made in the commodities boom of non renewable resources; an enhanced superannuation plan; the creation of a national curriculum based on specific subjects and the building of “better regional cities”. On the other hand, the coalition, apart from dictating their ideas on further productivity and positive changes for the country used scare tactics and the fact that Labour was unstable to their advantage. This worked to their benefit to a certain degree as many individuals were disappointed and confused with the decisions of the Labor Party. Leering closer to the election dates figures began to show that Gillard was mounting a strong campaign, and although coming in from behind she won many votes during the campaign. Labors transformation was working in its favour as it held a 42% approval rating as opposed to that of the Liberals a 38%. Gillard's personal approval rating was also many points higher than that of Abbotts, who has the lowest approval ratings since he became liberal leader. These percentages, when Gillard became contender, were entirely opposed as Labors change of leader was illustrated through a massive drop in support. On the 21st of August, voters headed to the polls but this was not even close to the end of this nail biting election. The results slowly began to illustrate that votes were tied as Labor possessed 73 seats and Liberal 72 of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives. No party held a majority (more than 76 seats) of which is required to guarantee a win. Labor needed to gain two votes and Liberal three from the independents in order to assure victory. This began a long and tedious negotiation period between the parties and the independents in order to certify their loyalty to either party that lasted weeks. It was the first hung elections in decades for the nation, as no party had majority over the opposition. Although voting is compulsory statistics post election showed that almost a million Australians decided not to vote and of those who did, around 730,000 chose to vote informally thus their vote was cancelled. Many questioned whether or not Gillard had made an error in deciding to set elections only five weeks after becoming the official candidate. Such prompt campaigns were not usual in Australian politics. Four vital independent votes were needed to reach the House of Representatives seats required. After 17 days of “political deadlock” the votes were locked, 76 for Labor and 74 for Liberal. The result: Julia Gillard was officially sworn in as the first female Prime Minister of Australia on the 14th of September. Gillard proudly stated after her win, “I have big ambitions for this country”. During her first 100 days as Prime Minister she has re launched the climate change debate and is currently on her first international trip, attending the Asia-Europe Meeting in Brussels which is the first of four conferences the Prime Minister will be attending in the coming weeks where we will see her abilities on the international scene as leader. *Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales. FACS - ORT Thu, 14 Oct 2010 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2617445775 Letras Internacionales emissions_trading national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers President Obama enters the second half of his first year with very high approval ratings (high 50s to mid-60s) and nearly unanimous support within his own party. He continues to fight his battles for long-term change with discipline and rigor, ignoring possible distractions but also exercising pragmatism and the art of compromise. After his initial successes on the stimulus bill, tobacco regulation, employment discrimination and children’s’ health coverage, and in spite of questions raised on the mounting deficit, he recently managed to get the House to pass major legislation on energy and climate change, albeit by a narrow vote (219 to 212).  His main strategy has been to lay out the general principles and parameters of his final objective and then let Congress write the legislation and fill in the details, thus giving legislators some latitude. Some question whether this strategy involves too much compromise, too many concessions to the other party and to interest groups, to the point that the final product is a watered down version of his initial proposal which will result too weak to solve the core problems.  The irony for Obama is that some parts of his proposals that were considered central and non-negotiable are now on the table. A main example is the public option in health care legislation, according to which a government plan would compete with the rest of the private insurers, and consumers would be able to choose which one to buy. This type of competition would bring down the costs, which is one main purpose of health care reform. Republicans are adamantly opposed to this, but even some Democrats in Congress are becoming skeptical about it (the latter, mostly because they will have to face conservative constituencies in the next legislative elections of 2010), and even Obama now appears ready to compromise, if absolutely necessary.  In contrast, there is immense support for this initiative all across the country. Does that mean that the actual center of the political public spectrum is today more to the Left than Congressmen and Senators of both parties recognize it to be? Or just that people really want change in health care, and cannot any longer be cowed into a corner by the boogey man of Big Government? Of course, there is a third and perhaps more obvious interpretation and that is that health industry groups exert more influence on Congress than the public itself. But at this time and on this issue the public is more mobilized and demanding than ever before, so Congress should take heed. Similarly, while Obama gets a positive response from the public as he continues to stitch together a broader view of how his proposals on health, energy and the stimulus package all fit together in the creation of a new foundation for the economy, the Republican Party appears bent on opposing him indiscriminately, denying him every possible venue to bipartisanship. That is the only position of strength for a weakened party. The “Party of No”, as Rahm Emmanuel calls it, continues to block, sometimes successfully, every initiative the Democrats put on the table. There is a total absence of alternative policy proposals; instead, Republicans are just saying no to comprehensive change. Even as most interest groups convinced that change in health care and energy policies is inevitable are taking part in the negotiations, the Republican Party directive to its senators in the Senate Finance Committee -where health legislation is being discussed- is not to deal at all.  The result is that Democrats are being pushed toward one concession after another, and that bad politics are getting in the way of good policy. The Republican strategy, if any, is to instill fear in moderate voters about the mounting deficit, and arouse skepticism about the President’s ability to bring about change. They have succeeded in consolidating the extreme right’s opposition to everything Obama does, thereby animating an alarming hostility toward him. This is an enormous achievement, if one considers the Republicans’ lack of leadership and the personal woes of some of its potential leaders. But they have made no gains in the center and very few with independents. And unexpected events continue to shake the party’s foundations. During the sleepy summer days around the Fourth of July, when most Americans go on vacation or take time off to prepare their cookouts and load up on beer and fireworks, the public was jolted by two stunning political developments, both coming from the Republican side and both bringing to a melodramatic end the careers of two potential presidential candidates: the five-day disappearance of South Carolina Governor Stanford, and Sarah Palin’s resignation as Governor of Alaska.  Governor Stanford, a “straight arrow” Republican with a picture-perfect family which he often paraded in front of the cameras, had always portrayed himself as a family man and a model of fiscal rectitude, going to the extreme of refusing to take the money allocated to his state as part of the stimulus package. After disappearing for five days during which his wife and aides claimed not to “know his exact location, but he was probably hiking along the Appalachian Trail and had turned off his Blackberry”, he re-emerged and walked straight into the trap of a press conference. In front of the cameras, he rambled for twenty minutes about his life as a governor, husband of a wonderful woman and dad of four great boys, and asked for forgiveness for letting them all down …in the pursuit of an affair with an Argentine woman he had met in the world-renown resort of Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 2001. After explaining that this was not, in the end, a reckless act of adultery nor an irresponsible abandonment of office, but “a true love story” during which he had found his “soul mate”, the Governor decided not to resign and to “try to fall in love again with his wife and continue his political career”. We won’t cry for him, neither here or in Argentina, but we wish him good luck.  While infidelity and other human foibles are not limited to one side of the aisle, for the Republican Party, which claims a monopoly on morality and family values, the last two years must have been a hard trial: from Representative Mark Foley’s “sexting” of underage male pages in Congress, to Senator Larry Craig’s gay sex soliciting in a public restroom, to Senator Ensign’s infidelity to Governor Sanford’s Rio de la Plata escapade (unknowingly paid for by South Carolina taxpayers), the party has had its hands full with spinning the unspinnable, and will have a difficult time if it insists on exclusively continue carrying the torch for family values . And then there is Sarah Palin, who, in an equally rambling, bizarre and juvenile statement delivered in her well-known unique and colorful syntax and diction, decided to stun her party, her base and the country as a whole by resigning her governorship 18 months before the end of her term. The reasons are known only to herself and her family, but she represented herself as not wanting to “milk ” the State of Alaska treasury during her “lame duck” period, and preferring to bring change for “all our children’s future from outside the Governor’s office”. Among the most commonly heard speculations: that the 16 ethics inquiries into her actions as governor by the Alaskan legislature (mainly Republicans) have put a lot of strain on her life and finances, that she wants to concentrate on a book deal, and that her governorship was getting in the way of her life as a celebrity. Less likely but also heard: that this is a move to pursue higher office, and/or that a new scandal is about to be revealed about her or her family. (Please, no more scandals!) Whatever her motive, her timing for the GOP could not have been worse: not only was Palin the most galvanizing force for the Evangelical Christian base of the party, but with her departure, the party has lost three strong presidential candidates in one month. If we add to this the lamentable performance by Governor Bobby Jindal, another Republican rising star, when he responded to Obama’s first State-of-the Union address, the party’s presidential candidate landscape is quite deserted. Of course it is still early to talk about 2011 primaries, but considering that the two main pillars of the party, namely fiscal responsibility and family values, have been demolished,(the first by George W. Bush and the second by the peccadilloes and tribulations above recounted), there is a lot of heavy lifting the party must do to become competitive again.  Like the Tories since 1997, the Republicans will probably have to lose two or three national elections before they can redefine themselves, charter a new course and become competitive again. The paradox of Republican opposition is that in the short term they have no other recourse but to strongly oppose Obama in the hope of chipping away some of his aura, while in the long term their big demographic problems with the young, women and minorities will force them to move to the center, modernize conservatism, abandon their unerring defense of pure, unrestrained capitalism and speak the language of community and common endeavors. Only then will they be able to reclaim the mantel of the Grand Old (but renewed) Party. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia Thu, 09 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2649137250 Letras Internacionales climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers Camila Thorndike, co-founder and executive director of Oregon Climate, paints a picture of how focused teamwork melts cynicism and unlocks grassroots power. She shares stories accumulated over 10 years in the climate movement, including co-founding Oregon Climate at age 25, garnering a dozen legislative sponsors for the Carbon Price and Dividend bill, and working with a close team of peers to educate and motivate thousands of Oregon voters for climate action. Thorndike provides audience members with a sharper understanding of how political change begins with inner focus and determination, as well as practical steps to advance carbon pricing legislation. Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2729595405 DigitalCommons@Linfield (Linfield College) carbon_tax national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers In an era when climate science is politically controversial, recent polling data shows that American women are more concerned about climate change than their male counterparts. This research uses both voting record analysis and qualitative interviews with legislators to examine whether the observed gender gap on climate change persists among elected political leaders. Linear and logistic regression results show no statistically significant climate change gender gap within legislative voting behavior, and interviews suggest that though women may be more willing to collaborate on climate change policy than men, subtle gender differences are often overridden by partisanship. However, findings suggest that reframing climate issues more broadly as environmental issues and connecting global issues to local community issues may elicit more support from female Republican legislators. Even small factors influencing political leaders' opinions on climate change matter in a world that must move towards climate solutions. Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2768421228 DigitalCommons-Macalester (Macalester College) climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1525/cse.2017.000927 In 2012, a large scale wind energy project was proposed for development in King Island, Tasmania, Australia. The project proponents adopted what they described as a ‘best practice’ approach to community engagement; an approach expected to achieve positive outcomes for developer and community by maximising community involvement in decision-making, limiting social conflict, and enhancing the potential of achieving the social licence to operate. Despite this, the community experience during the time of the proposal was one of conflict and distress, and the proposal was eventually cancelled due to exogenous economic factors. This case study explores a key element of the engagement process—holding a community vote—that caused significant problems for people and process. The vote appeared to be a democratic means to facilitate community empowerment in the decision-making process. However, in this study, we show that the vote resulted in an increase in conflict and polarisation, challenged the legitimacy of the consultative process and credibility of the proponents, and ultimately led to legal actions taken by opponents against the proponent. Factors including voter eligibility, the benchmark for success of the vote, campaigning, and responses to the outcome of the vote are examined to demonstrate the complexity of decision-making for renewable energy and land use change more generally. Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2800749241 Case Studies in the Environment wind_farm local_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers The 2007 federal election was meant to be the green election - climate change was firmly on the public agenda, the impact of the drought on food prices had put sustainable water supply in the public's mind, and the upcoming slaughter of whales by the Japanese in Australian waters demanded action from the federal government. So why did the minor parties such as the Greens not double their numbers? The answers are many and varied. Firstly, the overwhelming imperative of the majority of voters was to oust John Howard. This is clear from the massive 5.74% national swing to Labor (5.28% in the Senate), which was even higher at 8.13% in Kevin Rudd's home state of Queensland (7.55% in the Senate). In elections where there is an unpopular incumbent government, the major party vote is always higher, generally at the expense of support for minor parties. People simply felt they had to vote Labor 'to be sure' they were getting rid of Howard. This is in part due to a lack of understanding of the voting system by the public, including those with tertiary qualifications. Many people are unaware they can get double value from their vote, by preferencing the major party of their choice above the major party they do not support, and by voting 1 for a minor party to send a message that they prefer the policies of that minor party. The vagaries of the Senate preferencing system also engenders widespread suspicion and mistrust about backroom preference deals between parties, and undermines voter confidence in their power of their vote (less than 5% of voters vote below the line on the Senate ballot paper, so leave their choice of preferences to the party they vote for above the line). The complexity of the voting system in the two federal Houses of Parliament is compounded in Queensland by a different state voting system (optional preferential) and the lack of an upper house. The Australian Electoral Commission would do well to develop television advertising that advises people on how the federal voting system works. The Greens aired an advertisement explaining the preference system in the final weeks of the campaign (see www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ULN_ISLVtL4), but our limited resources did not enable a wide broadcast and its impact is therefore unknown. Secondly, the Presidential style of election campaign, with its focus on Kevin Rudd and John Howard, left little room for media coverage or public debate about that other crucial House of Parliament - the Senate. Many voters do not realise the function of the Senate or know who their 12 Senators are, and this again operates as a disincentive to voters supporting minor parties in the Senate - paradoxically, where they are most important to keeping the major parties accountable. The focus on the personalities of the two leaders also left little room for critical examination of the differences - or similarities - of parties' policies, including those of minor parties. Thirdly, Labor cleverly manipulated public perception by portraying itself as a green party. Ratification of Kyoto was bandied about as proof of Labor's climate change credentials, yet once in power and present at the BaIi negotiations, Australia refused to commit to proposed greenhouse gas reduction targets of 25%-40% by 2020. Labor managed to avoid much scrutiny of their adoption of John Howard's policy on native forest logging and of their support for environmentally destructive dams and energy-guzzling desalination, and hence were able to maintain the illusion of being a pro-environment party. Time will tell whether perception matches reality. Fourthly, environmental issues were not the only important policy area in the 2007 election. WorkChoices and to a lesser extent health, education and human rights were also important vote-shapers, yet Greens policies on these core issues were rarely reported on by the media, despite receiving specific endorsement from a variety of experts and representative bodies as the most responsible and forward-looking policies. … Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W288778016 Social alternatives climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12400 Abstract Why do Americans’ priorities for combating risks like terrorism, climate change, and violent crime often seem so uncorrelated with the dangers that those risks objectively present? Many scholars believe the answer to this question is that heuristics, biases, and ignorance cause voters to misperceive risk magnitudes. By contrast, this article argues that Americans’ risk priorities primarily reflect judgments about the extent to which some victims deserve more protection than others and the degree to which it is appropriate for government to intervene in different areas of social life. The article supports this argument with evidence drawn from a survey with 3,000 respondents, using pairwise comparisons to elicit novel measures of how respondents perceive nine dimensions of 100 life‐threatening risks. Respondents were well informed about these risks’ relative magnitudes—the correlation between perceived and actual mortality was .82—but those perceptions explained relatively little variation in policy preferences relative to judgments about the status of victims and the appropriate role of government. These findings hold regardless of political party, education, and other demographics. The article thus argues that the key to understanding Americans’ divergent reactions to risk lies more with their values than with their grasp of factual information. Tue, 16 Oct 2018 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2897282514 American Journal of Political Science climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1029/2018eo109341 Voters today will decide the fate of measures to increase renewable energy use, require larger buffer zones between people and oil and gas development, and establish a statewide carbon emissions fee. Tue, 06 Nov 2018 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2900341669 Eos other referendum journal_article https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.12617 THERE will be no long-term sustainable future for capitalism in the twenty-first century unless climate change can be limited. For a country like Britain, this means completely decarbonising the economy by the second half of the century, if not before. Britain's path towards a low-carbon economy has been significantly shaped by membership of the EU, especially through legislation and regulations affecting the energy sector, so Brexit raises important questions about whether and how that path will continue in the future. At the same time, Brexit poses some immediate and direct challenges for the security and costs of energy supply. This is because over the last twenty-five years the UK energy system itself has become intertwined with that of EU member states, through the development of the Internal Energy Market and the associated infrastructure. The UK is increasingly dependent on energy imports, many of which come from or pass through the EU. The EU has sought to increase its energy security, both through solidarity mechanisms between member states, and by forging better relationships with suppliers and transit countries. Leaving the EU therefore raises serious questions about the security and costs of Britain's future energy supplies. Moreover, Brexit is happening at a time of significant flux in energy systems around the world. After thirty years of free markets (at least in theory), state intervention and even re-nationalisation are increasingly back on the agenda. Even more fundamentally, new technology in electricity, coupled with developments in ICT and data handling, is leading to a rapid decentralisation of energy systems, disrupting established industry players and giving new roles to consumers. In what follows, we outline the key issues for energy and climate policy in a post-Brexit Britain. The next section looks at the potential impacts of different Brexit scenarios on energy supply, with a focus on costs and security. In the third section we consider how domestic political support for decarbonising energy may be affected by Brexit, and some of the low-carbon policy issues raised by separating from the EU. The fourth section looks at post-Brexit Britain in the light of long term technological and ownership trends in the energy sector. Our energy future could end up looking a lot more isolationist than it does now, or we could remain fairly integrated with the EU. Both futures are feasible, but differ significantly in the challenges they pose and opportunities they offer. The UK's energy policy and system have become increasingly integrated with the EU in recent decades, through regulatory harmonisation, common policy frameworks and infrastructure. But there has been little discussion of energy supply or its environmental impact within Brexit debates, except in the broadest terms. The July 2018 White Paper did not clarify the UK government's ambitions for the future relationship in this area. Effects of Brexit on energy supply will come via two routes: direct and indirect. Indirect effects work through routes outside energy policy and regulation. One of these is the impact of currency shocks or depreciation, leading to increases in the costs of fuels and imported inputs to supply chains. Another is potential disruption to supply chains as the UK leaves the Customs Union or the Single Market or both. There is also the possible effect of loss of access to skilled labour; for example, Oil and Gas UK estimate that around 5 per cent of the workforce in the North Sea is from EU countries.1 More generally, uncertainty linked to Brexit has cast a pall over investment decisions in the whole sector.2 The direct effects will come as a result of whether or not the UK stays in the Internal Energy Market (IEM). The IEM has developed over a number of decades through increasing European oversight and in areas such as market rules and environmental protection, legislative control of policy and regulation in the energy sectors of Member States. Thus, the IEM is not about tariffs but rather about a set of shared policies and rules and, more recently, participation in a linked automated network of trading platforms. The issues involved in leaving the IEM differ across gas, electricity and oil. Oil is globally traded, so the effects of Brexit can be expected to be fairly minor. By contrast, trade in gas and electricity, being largely or entirely networked through pipes and wires, is much more regional in nature. In the short term, the implications for gas security of supply are more important, but in the medium term it will be electricity that matters more, as we are likely to switch over to using electricity for cars and at least partially for heat as well, in order to decarbonise the economy. Gas trade with European countries from outside the IEM is entirely possible (as the example of Russia shows). The UK is well connected physically to the Continent, and with both North Sea fields and the largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure in Europe, it is a useful trading partner. The main concerns are therefore less about trade per se and more about security of supply and price stability at times of peak demand, when we become more dependent on imported gas. When the UK joined the then European Economic Community in 1973, it was poised to enter the North Sea oil and gas boom period (Figure 1). By contrast, it leaves as its energy import dependency has re-emerged, with domestic production of gas and oil expected to continue to decline. The UK is highly dependent on Norway for winter imports, which might become a problem if there were a situation in which the UK had to compete for Norwegian gas with the remaining EU Member States, since Norway, being a member of the European Economic Area, is more closely aligned with the latter. This situation, and resulting price volatility, may make a post-Brexit Britain seek other options, including more LNG and strategic gas storage which could cost in the order of a £100 million a year.3 For electricity, the present trade (which tends to run from the Continent to Britain) could, in principle, continue. But experience from Switzerland suggests that the EU increasingly sees electricity in terms of participation in a system with common rules and interlinked trading platforms. The latter have developed in the last two years into a ‘market coupling’ system that has reduced transaction costs and led to more efficient allocation of interconnector capacity. Exiting this system as part of the IEM would mean a loss of economic benefits, as prices are likely to rise. Estimates of what is potentially at stake are of the order of €100 million a year. However, the market coupling system is expected to evolve to allow shared electricity system balancing services (that is, matching supply and demand in real-time), access to which would be worth a lot more, potentially of the order of several billion pounds a year.4 The balancing service offered by interconnectors will be of increased value as the share of wind and solar and other variable renewables increases. Any resulting rise in final energy prices is likely to sharpen the politics of energy affordability and the costs of decarbonisation. There are, therefore, good security and economic reasons for remaining within the IEM. However, doing so whilst leaving the EU would also come with some ‘sovereignty costs’. These would include having to accept future EU energy legislation and regulation without having a formal say in their development, and the jurisdiction of, if not the European Court of Justice, some other arbitration mechanism acceptable to the EU-27. This loss of influence would be considerable, as the UK has historically been a strong voice in the development of an integrated European energy system. Before leaving energy supply issues, it is worth briefly considering two other special problems. One is the Single Electricity Market (SEM), a common integrated electricity market and system across Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which has been in place since 2007. The SEM involves shared regulation and major investments going into increased interconnection between the two. There are a number of possible post-Brexit arrangements, somewhat mirroring those arising from the wider Irish border problem. Maintaining the SEM has been recognised as a priority by all negotiating parties, and the UK government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining the SEM in the July 2018 White Paper, but finding a solution will be politically delicate. The other special problem is ‘Brexatom’ (British withdrawal from the Euratom Treaty). For more than sixty years, the Treaty has shaped the UK's domestic nuclear legislation, including standards and rules on nuclear safety and non-proliferation, health and safety and nuclear waste management. Of greatest concern is the non-proliferation of nuclear material. Currently, this is overseen by Euratom safeguards inspectors on behalf of the international community. Outside of Euratom, inspections will need to be carried out by the UK's Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), directly reporting to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The ONR accepts that it will not be possible to have capacity in place by March 2019 to inspect the same number of facilities as under Euratom, although it says that it will meet international standards. In addition, the UK will need to negotiate and ratify new bilateral agreements for supply of nuclear material and equipment, in particular with Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States before the UK leaves the EU, or if there is one, at the end of the transition period. All of this is possible, but will take additional resources for the ONR and time is pressing. Post-Brexit, concerns about energy security, affordability and competitiveness are likely to rise up the agenda, which raises the question of whether the low carbon agenda survives. A common view is that it will, because the two key frameworks setting the UK's ambition on climate policy—the 2008 Climate Change Act (CCA) and the 2016 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Agreement—are not dependent on the EU. Brexit is likely to require the UK to adopt its own Nationally Defined Contribution under the Paris Agreement, but this is a relatively minor technical change. More important is the argument that the UK will lose influence because it will no longer be part of the EU bloc, but rather just one country with around 1 per cent of global carbon emissions.5 Moreover, with the loss of UK advocacy internally, there is a risk that the EU will be a weaker ally in the international arena. However, at present both the UK and the EU have signalled a desire to continue working closely together at the international level. At the same time, the 2008 CCA commits the UK to emissions reductions targets that are more ambitious than those of the EU. However, a significant part of expected UK emissions reduction to 2030—the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) puts it at 50 per cent—is through areas covered by EU legislation and regulation, such as energy efficiency and vehicle emissions standards. These frameworks should be incorporated into UK law through the Great Repeal Act, but they have been flagged as delivery risks by the CCC6 and there are concerns that without the EU to enforce them there will be a governance gap. In practice, both the UK's efforts in international climate leadership and the future efficacy of the CCA depend in large part on the domestic politics of climate change policy. There is broad support for action on climate change in the UK, but the issue is of low salience to most voters, so that support is not deep. The CCA does benefit from strong support from business, both in the energy sector and more generally; for example, in April 2018, twenty-one major energy firms and other businesses called on the UK government and the EU to continue to work closely towards meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.7 Nevertheless, two fears remain. One is that if there is a deep economic shock on leaving the EU, public support for climate policy will be overwhelmed by concerns about costs. It is already the case that policy costs associated with carbon reduction, especially on electricity bills, are set to grow to 2020.8 A second fear is of hostile attacks on climate change policy and science from a resurgent right-wing populism. Surveys show that Leave voters tend to be more sceptical of climate science than the general population, and while UKIP as an organised force has dissipated, its supporters and voters are still around. One would expect their presence to be felt especially within the Conservative party. Yet it is far from clear that the current party leadership is tacking to the right on climate change. While there has been significant dismantling of policy, for example on support for solar photovoltaic (PV) and onshore wind, and scrapping the zero-carbon homes standard, there have also been some proactive steps, such as a suggested phase-out of conventional diesel and petrol cars by 2040 and an instruction to the Committee on Climate Change to look at the implications of increasing ambition on the UK's 2050 target. It is hard to think this approach is not at least in part a political strategy from a Conservative government aimed at appealing to younger voters, who are both more concerned about climate change and more likely to vote Labour. While the Conservatives need to appeal more to such voters, the party is in a brittle and unstable state, and a stronger shift towards right-wing populism is a significant possibility, as is some successor to, or resurgence of, UKIP. Such developments would be a major threat to the decarbonisation agenda, and could see the weakening, if not the repeal of the 2008 CCA. If commitment on climate change action remains strong, what are the post-Brexit policy issues? One is how to price carbon emissions. The EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS) has been a centrepiece of Europe-wide climate policy since 2005. The UK government wants to stay in the scheme until 2020, but it is not clear what the desired relationship will be beyond this. The ETS has been largely ineffective because of lobbying, and a domestic emissions trading scheme might be an opportunity for a better design, but it would have a smaller trading pool, and the practicalities of setting up a new scheme could take several years. The simplest option would be to build on the current UK carbon floor price policy by bringing in a carbon tax. However, the effectiveness of a tax will depend on the level at which it is set, and this in turn will be determined by the political considerations discussed above. A second issue is support given to low carbon technologies, at present mainly in electricity generation. Renewables are most vulnerable, as historically, UK governments have been lukewarm towards such technologies, and policy has really been driven from the EU via the Renewables Directives. The exception here is offshore wind, which has now reached a critical mass where it is producing such employment, investment and potential export benefits that it has won government backing. Looking beyond 2020, a post-Brexit Britain would have to be extremely isolationist to resist the global trend towards cheaper renewables. Investment will depend on market design, which needs reform, and planning rules. Recent UK governments have been keen on new nuclear power, but here there are potential headwinds post-Brexit. Nuclear remains less popular with the public than renewable energy and it currently looks expensive, as noted in the 2018 National Infrastructure Assessment.9 A third issue is the loss of low-carbon investment support. The UK has received around £2.5 billion a year in energy loans and grants from the EU, including infrastructure finance, regional development funding and grants for research and development. The most significant loss would be reduced or even loss of funding from the European Investment Bank (EIB), as nearly 30 per cent of loans to the UK have supported energy infrastructure, amounting to over £8 billion in the past five years, levering in investment from others. Ninety per cent of EIB investment goes to Member States, so outside of the EU it will be more difficult for the UK to access loans and a replacement will be needed. In addition to decarbonisation, the UK energy system is evolving in a number of other ways. One relates to ownership and markets. When the UK joined the EEC in 1973, energy industries were state-owned monopolies. This situation was transformed by the liberalisation revolution of the 1980s and 1990s. However, this Thatcherite project was barely complete when a slow drift back towards state intervention began from the early 2000s onwards. The retreat from free markets was initially linked to decarbonisation goals, but as energy prices rose sharply in the latter part of the decade, scepticism about the true extent of competition in retail markets also came to the fore, leading to price controls. Labour under Jeremy Corbyn has gone further, calling for a return to public ownership in the energy sector in the 2017 election manifesto. Public ownership is allowed within the current rules of the IEM as long as networks, generation and supply are not owned within the same part of the state. Indeed, ironically, many of the companies active in British markets have parents in other EU Member States that are state owned; not just four of the ‘Big Six’ energy utilities, but also major players in offshore wind and new nuclear developments. In a post-Brexit Britain, that foreign ownership might come under scrutiny. However, it is worth noting that the parts of the energy sector specifically targeted by Labour for renationalisation are gas and electricity networks owned mainly by companies and banks in Asia, Australia and North America.10 Public ownership in energy is a post-Brexit approach to ‘taking back control’ that offers an alternative to sovereignty and ethno-nationalist narratives. But a return to the statism of the 1970s is not feasible; the challenge will be how to make public ownership work for a twenty-first century energy system that is undergoing major technological and institutional change. A second trend is in the devolution of policy making. Historically, British energy policy has been set centrally, and markets and networks have operated within GB-wide regulatory frameworks. This unitary approach changed with devolution in the late 1990s. Energy policy is somewhat of a grey area in devolution: Whitehall has retained control of the key legal frameworks and financial but there are important between the and Energy policy, regulation and markets in Northern Ireland are now largely run from the of the UK, except for nuclear At the other end of the has a in areas such as energy efficiency and is in an having a of control over policy which it has to out a somewhat have that Brexit, through the of directly from to might an opportunity for a to the for example on climate However, it is not clear that Brexit is for this to For example, the government is currently on a Climate Change that would have a emissions reduction than the 2008 CCA. It has for oil and gas, out new nuclear in and is all policies that set it from the UK's also has some control over renewables policy, and political support for wind has led more as well as wind a from what would change with a hard Brexit would be the of the common EU for energy and climate policy, and the that between and would likely with more renewable and going for more nuclear with given the technical between these two we could see the development of two largely energy systems, wider The third important trend is about the decentralisation of the electricity system on and networks is giving to one with a large number of technologies, including wind and solar increasingly through and control The between and of electricity are with a number of in electricity markets and trading already in parts of Britain. the to the electricity system has historically been by and it will increasingly come from the demand in homes and businesses and through the costs of which are of cars and the of technologies, the of storage will These present a number of One is that major investments in the of infrastructure across the country will be needed. Another is since energy decentralisation is an global there are potential export markets with for those companies to take a However, the of the UK to access the EU part of that market will be by the post-Brexit including trade in There are also potential regional development opportunities in the strategic of research and development which could some of the impacts of For example, under its the government has million in vehicle research in the However, far more will need to be not least because the UK may lose access to a large share of EU low carbon funding and will be no longer for EU and There is also a that Brexit might the of change. This is because under in which the UK is no longer in the there will be less electricity and as a domestic low-carbon of will be at a It may also be that leaving the IEM Britain more to policy and regulatory that might the of energy especially in of that is currently difficult under EU The energy revolution is for large energy and network It out the that and could become far more in the production and of more of the implications for climate change and to back control’ from large utilities, which low public The of or are if However, there are other for a system in which control to to out new roles for in the in with such as or who will to the of resources around the need to in active to is up with questions of control and in gas and electricity are networked a Brexit leaving the IEM will mean a more and energy future for Britain Northern Ireland if the Irish SEM is could potentially lose access to the efficient trading mechanisms of market coupling and for electricity interconnection with are likely to slow or even price for would be relatively but the opportunity costs of access to shared balancing services will be Britain may have to build more LNG and gas storage facilities to price volatility, to costs. of access to of pounds worth of EIB funding would also make investment costs unless an domestic public investment is Economic shocks and are a hard Brexit with the of an resurgence of right-wing would a serious challenge to the current political on decarbonisation. a to the might see a return to public ownership in may from different parts of the UK, especially as and their energy systems in ways. However, there are also major long-term going on in energy that are global in and so that even a more post-Brexit Britain is likely to be affected by trends include the costs of renewable electricity and electricity storage technologies, and the of energy a of domestic climate policy, in the longer term Britain's energy system is likely to continue to and A on electricity and more from wind and solar means that balancing the system will become more difficult but also more interconnection with Britain's would an important but in an post-Brexit we would need to back more on domestic of This could potentially be into an but if access to global markets can be retained and what Britain's energy future will look like in terms of ownership and on which of out in post-Brexit At the different return to maintaining the current or a and to some be across the major political But the about them remains the of The funding from the UK Energy supported by the UK under the and for the research on which much of this is Mon, 26 Nov 2018 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2903384955 The Political Quarterly climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://doi.org/10.1080/00330124.2018.1559658 Disdain for empirical science has a long history dating back to eighteenth-century debates about the Earth’s surface formation. Scientific debates over global catastrophic flooding and the Earth’s geologic age were resolved by the mid-nineteenth century, but subsequent nonscientific debates about the Earth’s age and biological evolution spawned a distrust of science that hardened in the twentieth century. Disregard for science grew in the United States with abandonment of science-based policy by government and manipulation of public opinion by social media. Consequently, climate change denial was readily accepted by a preconditioned antiscience culture. Expansion of antiscience sentiment led to rejection of conventional news outlets and information verification in a “post-truth” era in which alternate realities are acceptable despite clear contradictions with observable facts. Critical reasoning and vetting of information are in decline, which leaves democracy vulnerable to manipulation. Reliable information is available but obscured by disinformation. Public scrutiny of information and demand for fact checking and reporting of sources are essential given growth of alternative media that have no checks on the verity of content. Academics should get involved in popular media to counter propaganda and to reconstruct a culture of critical reasoning by voters and science-based decisions by policymakers. Key Words: antiscience, critical reasoning, democracy, history of science. Mon, 29 Apr 2019 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2942531143 The Professional Geographer climate_policy_general national_election journal_article https://climate-voting.livingmeta.ai/papers In 2016 the nation’s first carbon tax proposal was presented to the Washington State legislature by way of citizen initiative. Failing there, Initiative 732: Washington Carbon Emission Tax and Sales Tax Reduction was put to the popular vote in the November general election, with the same result even though support for Initiative 732 had been consistently gaining for months, with the pro-coalition outspending the opposing coalition by nearly two to one. I-732 ultimately garnered support from only 40% of Washington voters on Election Day. If money didn’t make the difference, what did? Some attributed the loss to active opposition coming from within the environmental community; although opponents of the carbon tax and sales tax reduction included expected fossil fuel and industrial interests, other significant opponents included the Sierra Club as well as the Washington State Democratic Party. Certainly the compositions of the coalitions had some bearing on the decisions of voters on Election Day. Perhaps more specifically, the messages promulgated by the pro and con coalitions affected and informed the ultimate defeat of Washington’s first carbon tax proposal. This research study set out to analyze those messages found in public consumption documents generated by coalition members such as editorials and blog posts by way of narrative policy analysis. The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) lends itself as a means of finding connections between narratives that are utilized in policy processes, like Washington’s I-732 carbon tax debate, and policy outcomes, e.g. the failure of I-732 – in a scientifically verifiable manner. This study addresses two NPF-inspired questions: How did opposing groups construct policy narratives in the debates surrounding I-732? and Are there differences in how the winning coalition versus losing coalitions portrayed characters (heroes, villains, and victims) in the policy narratives surrounding the I-732 carbon tax debate? Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2949688640 Western CEDAR (Western Washington University) carbon_tax referendum journal_article https://doi.org/10.1029/2019eo127177 As Democratic candidates debate in Miami, Fla., new surveys indicate that climate change and clean energy are among the top priorities for Democratic voters in 2020. Wed, 26 Jun 2019 00:00:00 GMT https://openalex.org/W2955889757 Eos climate_policy_general national_election journal_article